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A growing body of literature highlights moral reasons for embracing global democracy. This literature justifies democracy
on the grounds of its intrinsic value. But democracy also has instrumental value: the rule of the many is epistemically supe-
rior to the rule of one or the rule of the few. I draw on the tradition of epistemic democracy to develop an instrumentalist
justification for democratizing global governance. I develop an epistemic-democratic framework for evaluating political in-
stitutions—one composed of three principles. The likelihood of making correct decisions within institutions of global gov-
ernance increases when those institutions maximize (1) human development and capacity for participation; (2) their inter-
nal cognitive diversity; and (3) public opportunities for sharing objective and subjective knowledge. Applying this
framework to global governance produces a better understanding of the nature and extent of its “democratic deficit,” as
well as the actions required to address this deficit.
Introduction
Global governance suffers from a democratic deficit. In
protests and activism surrounding the WTO, G8, and UN
climate negotiations, participants decry the despotism of
powerful, exclusive, and opaque international institutions.
Civil society’s demands for inclusion may not always take
the form of explicit demands for democracy, but they
couch them in democratic values—such as transparency,
representation, participation, accountability, and
citizenship.
These demands resonate with—and often animate—
scholarly considerations of global democratization.
International Relations scholars have traditionally given
little thought to democracy. As Archibugi and Held
(2011, 433) observe, most International Relations text-
books prior to 1989 do not even contain the word “de-
mocracy.” For many years, International Relations scholars
cared about democracy largely in the context of democra-
tization in weak or failing states, or when investigating
how domestic regime type affects foreign policy. Similarly,
democratic theorists traditionally focused on the nation-
state. But global institutions increasingly exercise
decision-making authority. This creates challenges for de-
mocracy and, for many, an imperative to extend demo-
cratic values beyond the nation-state. The challenges and
opportunities for democratic rule at the global level are
now acknowledged in almost all recent handbooks on
both democracy and international relations (Archibugi
and Held 2011, 433–44).1
The growing literature on global democratic theory ana-
lyzes how globalization affects the theory and practice of
democracy (Bray and Slaughter 2015). It brings various
normative lenses to bear on this question, including liberal,
republican, cosmopolitan, deliberative, and radical demo-
cratic traditions. While precise conceptualizations of de-
mocracy vary, participants in these debates share an under-
standing of democracy as, in broad terms, referring to “the
various overlapping ways in which citizens interact and in-
fluence public decision-making processes” (Archibugi and
Held 2011, 4). Scholars who examine the democratic defi-
cit of global governance prescribe various remedies, includ-
ing global parliaments (Falk and Strauss 2000), cosmopoli-
tan institutions (Held 1995), deliberative systems (Dryzek
2009; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014), stakeholder democracy
(Macdonald 2008; B€ackstrand 2006), democratic global
constitutionalism (Peters 2009), global forums of social
movements (Smith et al. 2016), and gender-sensitive re-
forms or transformations (Eschle 2002).
In the main, moral concerns for democratizing global
rule animate this scholarship. It assumes that democracy
has intrinsic value because its procedures are fair and just:
people are morally entitled to contribute to collective de-
cisions that affect them, and democracy respects this enti-
tlement. Without wishing to subordinate the intrinsic
value of democracy, in this paper I argue that democracy
also has instrumental value. This shifts attention away from
the fairness of democracy to its consequences. Democracy
is more inclusive than other forms of decision-making,
and it is more effective at tapping into diverse perspec-
tives. As I will argue, inclusive and diverse decision-
making procedures are likely to produce better outcomes
than those that are exclusive and homogeneous.
Justifications for expanding participation in decision-
making in global institutions would prove considerably
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stronger if they paid more attention to instrumentalist
justifications.2
Contemporary epistemic democrats generally present
their arguments as augmenting, rather than challenging,
alternative theories of democracy.3 Deliberative democrats
concern themselves with the legitimacy of democratic au-
thority; epistemic democrats generally focus on its instru-
mentalist justification.4 A deliberative conception of legiti-
macy roots itself in “the resonance of collective decisions
with public opinion, defined in terms of the provisional
engagement and contestation of discourses in the public
sphere as transmitted to public authority in empowered
space” (Dryzek 2010, 40–41). Unlike epistemic democrats,
deliberative democrats usually shy away from attributing
an epistemic value to processes of engagement. For delib-
erative democrats, decisions should resonate with re-
flected public opinion because this constitutes legitimate
procedure—not because it approximates the truth.5 I draw
on insights of epistemic-democratic theory to defend the
instrumental value of inclusivity and diversity in global
governance. Following Dryzek (2009), I treat global de-
mocracy as a process of democratization. This allows us to
consider potential piecemeal reforms to existing processes
and institutions to improve their democratic quality,
rather than aim to replace the existing system.
This article proceeds in four sections. Following this in-
troduction, I trace the tradition of epistemic democracy
back to its ancient roots to identify its core assumptions. I
then focus on three prominent questions in contemporary
debates about epistemic democracy. First, are “the peo-
ple” sufficiently competent to entrust with decision-
making? Second, must decision-makers maintain cognitive
independence to reach the correct decision? Third, is the
pursuit of “truth” appropriate in politics? I outline the
competing perspectives and clarify my own position. I
then make a case for extending epistemic democracy to
the global level, and construct an epistemic-democratic
framework for evaluating global governance. This frame-
work rests on maximizing three principles: (1) human de-
velopment and capacity for participation; (2) the internal
cognitive diversity of global institutions; and (3) public op-
portunities for sharing objective and subjective knowl-
edge. My examination reveals shortcomings but also possi-
bilities for improvement. I conclude the paper by
identifying next steps for a research agenda on global epi-
stemic democratization.
Foundations of Epistemic Democracy
The philosophical foundations of epistemic democracy
trace back at least as far as Aristotle, who introduced the
idea that “more heads are better than one” in chapter 11
of Politics (350 BC):
For the many, of whom each individual is not a good
man, when they meet together may be better than
the few good, if regarded not individually but
collectively . . . . For each individual among the many
has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and
when they meet together, just as they become in a
manner one man, who has many feet, and hands,
and senses, so too with regard to their character and
thought. Hence the many are better judges than a
single man of music and poetry; for some under-
stand one part, and some another, and among them
they understand the whole (cited in Waldron
[1995], 564)
He further elaborated on the doctrine of the “wisdom of
the multitude” (Waldron 1995) in chapter 15:
Taken individually, any one of these people [mem-
bers of the assembly] is perhaps inferior to the best
person. But a city-state consists of many people, just
like a feast to which many contribute, and is better
than one that is a unity and simple. That is why a
crowd can also judge many things better than any
single individual. (quoted in Landemore 2013, 61)
Later, in the eighteenth century, the French mathemati-
cian and philosopher the Marquis de Condorcet added
statistical support to Aristotle’s philosophical logic.
Concerned with reforming the French system of justice by
developing epistemically defensible processes of jurist
election and decision-making, Condorcet formulated the
hypothesis now known as Condorcet Jury Theorem
(Williams 2007, 187–90). List and Goodin (2001, 283) ex-
plain this theorem thus:
(i)f each member of a jury is more likely to be right
than wrong, then the majority of the jury, too, is
more likely to be right than wrong; and the probabil-
ity that the right outcome is supported by a majority
of the jury is a (swiftly) increasing function of the
size of the jury, converging to 1 as the size of the jury
tends to infinity.
This law of large numbers rests on conditions of voter inde-
pendence, competence, and sincerity, and it ultimately reaches
the conclusion that “larger groups make better decisions,
and very large groups are infallible” (Dietrich and
Spiekermann 2013, 88). The condition of independence re-
quires that voters form preferences and cast votes truth-
fully and free from others’ influence. The condition of
competence requires that each voter has at least a marginally
greater than 50% chance of being correct (Dietrich and
Spiekermann 2013, 91–92). Widespread ignorance would
undermine the potential for epistemic democracy. This
concerned Condorcet (1976, 49), who feared that increas-
ing the number of people in an assembly would increase
the levels of ignorance: “(a) very numerous assembly can-
not be composed of very enlightened men. It is even prob-
able that those comprising this assembly will on many mat-
ters combine great ignorance with many prejudices. Thus
there will be a great number of questions on which the
2 On the intrinsic-instrumentalist distinction in democratic theory, see
Christiano (2003, 3–16).
3 Instrumentalist justifications for democracy appear in epistemic theories of
democracy extending back to Aristotle. In fact, the tradition of epistemic de-
mocracy is enjoying a renaissance within political theory and popular non-
fiction. Scott Page’s The Difference, James Surowieski’s The Wisdom of Crowds,
and Cass Sunstein’s Infotopia all advance the Aristotelian adage that “more
heads are better than one.” Landemore and Elster (2012) lead this scholarly
revival. They extoll the virtues of “collective intelligence” in public life.
4 Some epistemic democrats aim to address moral and instrumentalist justifica-
tions for democratic authority (for example, Estlund [2008]). Others bracket
the question of legitimacy to focus on the epistemic attributes of deliberation
and democracy. I follow this latter, more modest, approach.
5 Notable exceptions are green political theorists who often gravitate toward
deliberative democracy because it is most likely to produce good environmen-
tal outcomes (for example, Baber and Bartlett [2005]).
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probability of the truth of each voter will be below 1=2.”
But, when voters are independent, truthful, voting on the
same topic, and more than likely to be right than wrong,
then the probability of a correct decision increases toward
100% as the number of voters increases (Goodin 2008,
80–86). In this way, collective decisions will produce a
more truthful outcome than an individual, however com-
petent, can produce alone. While originally theorized for
situations in which voters had a choice between two alter-
natives, List and Goodin (2001, 279) show that Condorcet
Jury Theorem theoretically holds where there are multiple
alternatives. The condition of sincerity requires that those
involved in decision-making truthfully register a vote or
judgment that they believe will benefit the common good.
A sincere vote or judgment is therefore distinct from a
purely self-interested or strategic vote (Landemore 2013,
154). Contrary to rational choice theory, studies of voting
psychology and practice show that “pocketbook voting” is
not the norm. Voters usually distinguish between personal
and governmental problems; they usually consider the big
picture rather than their own predicament; and they do
not usually reason purely on the basis of their own socio-
economic position (Popkin 1991, 31–34).
Condorcet Jury Theorem traditionally relies on voting to
extract epistemic value from large numbers of people. But
as Goodin (2008, 81) observes, voting is not a necessary fea-
ture of the theorem; it equally holds if we replace voting
with judgment: “so long as each informant brings indepen-
dent judgment to bear on the same subject, and individuals’
judgments are on average more likely to be correct than in er-
ror, then the most common judgment among a large num-
ber of individuals is almost certain to be the correct judg-
ment.” Writing in the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill
elaborated an epistemic account of collective decision-
making based on deliberation instead of voting. Mill (1861,
45–46) rejected the assumed superiority of a “good despot”
model of government, arguing that to be effective and vir-
tuous the despot would not only have to be good but also
all-seeing: so informed, insightful, and observant as to be
“superhuman.” Instead, the best form of government
would be one in which “sovereignty . . . is vested in the en-
tire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only hav-
ing a voice . . . but being, at least occasionally, called on to
take an actual part in the government” (Mill 1861, 53).
Mill’s (1861, 73–74) vision of representative parliament was
that of a “Congress of Opinions”:
an arena in which not only the general opinion of the
nation, but that of every section of it, and, as far as pos-
sible, of every eminent individual whom it contains,
can produce itself in full light and challenge discus-
sion; where every person . . . may count upon finding
somebody who speaks his mind as well or better than
he could speak it himself—not to friends and partisans
exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested
by adverse controversy.
Parliament, in Mill’s vision, was a place for talking, but
not a place for doing. This leads contemporary scholars
to describe Mill as an epistemic liberal but not an episte-
mic democrat (Schwartzberg 2015, 194–95). Discussion
ought to feed into decisions, but ultimately the “conduct
of public business” was a task for those high public offi-
cials “specially trained” to do it (Mill 1861, 105–6). The
Congress of Opinions should be limited to debate, cri-
tique, and suggestions.
Key Debates in Epistemic Democratic Theory
Historical and contemporary scholarship lack a single the-
ory of epistemic democracy. In contemporary scholarship,
debate focuses on three key questions: (1) are “the people”
sufficiently competent to entrust with decision-making? (2)
must decision-makers maintain cognitive independence to
reach the correct decision? and (3) is the pursuit of “truth”
appropriate in politics?6 In their efforts to advance logically
and empirically robust accounts of epistemic democracy,
contemporary scholars provide different responses to these
questions (List and Goodin 2001; Peter 2009; Landemore
2012a, 2013; Landemore and Elster 2012).
Are “the People” Sufficiently Competent?
Political philosophy has had an elitist, anti-democratic
streak at least since Plato’s time. It is “a widely held con-
tention . . . that the average man is incapable of partaking
in a system of self-government because of his invariable
confusion and misdirection over what is actually best for
himself or essential to his wellbeing” (Meyer 1974, 200).
Early epistemic democrats generally shared this suspicion.
While retaining faith in the superiority of “rule by the
many” over “rule by the few,” Condorcet, Mill, and others
were wary of entrusting the public with public decision-
making responsibilities.
Exclusion on grounds of ignorance is built into
Condorcet’s theorem. He considered it a “dangerous”
proposition to “give a democratic constitution to an unen-
lightened people” (quoted in Landemore 2013, 150–51).
But Condorcet criticized structural inequality and de-
fended human rights and the emancipation of women
and slaves. His faith in enlightenment was not reserved
for a few brilliant men. Instead, Condorcet assumed that
public education could lead to mass enlightenment
(Lukes and Urbinati 2012, xxi–xxii). Mill also favored giv-
ing extra votes to well-educated people. Like Condorcet,
Mill reasoned that their superior wisdom justified a higher
level of political influence. While he advocated the in-
volvement of all people in deliberation, he wished to
avoid the epistemic failures that might result from the ed-
ucated being outnumbered by the uneducated (Estlund
2008, 206–22). Mill’s intention was not to consolidate a sit-
uation of inequality but rather to promote the importance
of publicly funded education and civic participation
(Mackie 2012, 298).
Contemporary epistemic democrats generally distance
themselves from their forerunners’ mistrust in the masses.
One contemporary position holds that ignorance does not
disrupt the law of large numbers. Landemore’s (2013, 50)
theorem of “diversity trumps ability” is characteristic of this
position. She acknowledges the pervasiveness of public igno-
rance,7 but argues that the significance of individual igno-
rance diminishes when people are drawn into a group.
Under the right conditions, she argues, the group itself can
outsmart any individual within that group. People as a collec-
tive are competent when they lack competence as individ-
uals. In the following section, I explain the conditions under
which this would hold. Another contemporary position em-
phasizes the importance of public education, but also values
people’s lived experiences. This avoids the
6 These are not the only points of debate, but on my reading of the literature
these questions are the most contentious and hence the most appropriate to
address within the limited scope of this article.
7 Various studies in the United States reveal high levels of ignorance about do-
mestic and foreign political systems and current affairs (Landemore 2013, 36).
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disenfranchisement that Condorcet and Mill advocate, while
recognizing the merit in enhancing competence. John
Dewey (1916, 1–10) held such a position and drew a distinc-
tion between the formal education of schooling and the in-
formal education of experience and socialization. Balancing
the two was essential for social advancement.
My position in this debate draws on insights from early
and contemporary epistemic theorists. Enhancing people’s
competence to contribute to deliberation and decision-
making about public affairs requires addressing pervasive ig-
norance and the deprivation of basic needs that inhibit par-
ticipation. There may be strong moral justifications for mini-
mizing inequalities (Dingwerth 2014), but the jury is out on
whether there are strong instrumental reasons for doing so.8
What is clear is that there are strong instrumental reasons
for meeting a minimum threshold of basic needs.9
Condorcet’s theorem rests on the assumption that “(t)he de-
gree of rightness would vary in accordance with the degree
of enlightenment and the size of the majority” (Williams
2007, 190). The more competent people involved, the better
the outcome. Increasing the degree of rightness requires ad-
dressing the conditions that suppress competence or enlight-
enment. One promising way to think about competence is
the capabilities approach. Nussbaum’s (2011, 20–21) con-
cept of “central capabilities” encompasses attributes of physi-
cal well-being as well as traits and abilities that are learned or
developed. The substance of essential capabilities is a matter
best determined through epistemic democratic procedures.
Provisionally, though, four of Nussbaum’s (2011, 33–34) cen-
tral capabilities have particular epistemic relevance:
1. Life: “Being able to live to the end of a human life of
normal length; not dying prematurely, or before
one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living;”
2. Bodily health: “Being able to have good health, includ-
ing reproductive health; to be adequately nourished;
to have adequate shelter;”
3. Senses, imagination, and thought: “Being able to use
the senses, to imagine, think, and reason . . . includ-
ing, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic
mathematical and scientific training. Being able to
use imagination and thought in connection with
experiencing and producing works and events of
one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so
forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected
by guarantees of freedom of expression . . . ”;
4. Practical reason: “Being able to form a conception of
the good and to engage in critical reflection about
the planning of one’s life . . .”
Such a capabilities approach defines a human develop-
ment agenda that now informs international welfare agen-
cies and governments alike (Nussbaum 2011, x).
Is Cognitive Independence Necessary?
In its original formulation, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
relies on the ambitious condition of cognitive indepen-
dence: it requires that people do not communicate when
forming and registering a view. In his recent popular ac-
count of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, Surowiecki (2005,
41) defends the importance of independence on two
grounds: “(f)irst, it keep(s) the mistakes people make
from becoming correlated. Errors in individual judgment
won’t wreck the group’s collective judgment as long as
those errors are systematically pointing in the same direc-
tion . . . Second, independent individuals are more likely
to have new information rather than the same old data ev-
eryone else is familiar with.” Sunstein (2006, 28) notes
that this assumption might hold among punters at a fun-
fair estimating the weight of an animal, but for any issue
of public concern individuals do communicate, and their
perspectives and preferences are shaped by various com-
mon factors (the media; conversations with friends; politi-
cal rhetoric; etc.). This is also true of experts who draw on
the same publicly available evidence. Economists called
on to estimate the probability of a recession are likely to
interpret the same evidence with the same theoretical
models that they were taught. They are therefore influ-
enced in the same way and not cognitively independent. A
large group of these economists is just as likely to miss a
pending crash as a small group (Dietrich and
Spiekermann 2013, 94).
Landemore’s account of epistemic democracy replaces
an emphasis on cognitive independence with an emphasis
on cognitive diversity. Indeed, the Condorcetian condi-
tion of cognitive independence is implicitly based on an
assumption that individuals have access to diverse infor-
mation, which would be tainted by consultation with
others. For Landemore, the value of collective decision-
making rests on the concept of “collective intelligence,”
which combines two factors. “One factor is the ability of
sophistication of the individual members of the group,
which can be expressed as an average ability. . . The other
factor is ‘cognitive diversity’ or, roughly, the existence
within a given group of different ways to see the world, in-
terpret it, and apply predictive models in it” (Landemore
2012b, 3). The rule of the many is thus inherently supe-
rior to the rule of the one or of the few, because these sys-
tems lack cognitive diversity. Landemore’s (2013, 104) so-
lution for maximizing cognitive diversity is simply to
increase numbers: “the advantage of involving large num-
bers is that it automatically ensures greater cognitive diver-
sity.” She suggests that it is simply more plausible to as-
sume that cognitive diversity increases as numbers
increase than it is to assume that cognitive diversity in-
creases as numbers decrease.
The shift from cognitive independence to cognitive di-
versity is a convincing development in epistemic demo-
cratic theory. However, we cannot assume that increasing
numbers would increase diversity. A randomly selected
jury may contain fairly homogeneous individuals, with per-
spectives shaped by similar experiences or media.
Irrespective of its size, a committee or decision-making
body selected on merit may also be fairly homogeneous.
Insofar as merit is interpreted narrowly, there is a danger
of squeezing out diversity by homogenizing competence.
Maximizing the likelihood of a group making the “right”
decision requires mitigating this homogeneity. An addi-
tional intervention for maximizing diversity is to deliber-
ately ensure that various life experiences and social posi-
tions are represented within decision-making bodies.
Ober (2012, 119–22) argues that Athens was able to out-
perform its city-state rivals partly because its participatory
democracy harnessed diversity to better confront chal-
lenges. The Athenian Council of 500 was responsible for
governance tasks ranging from agenda setting to policy
implementation, and was constituted by socially and geo-
graphically diverse decision-makers. Mechanisms such as
8 Landemore (2014a) has recently suggested that egalitarian inclusiveness is
best suited to decision-making in complex and uncertain conditions.
9 Given that meeting such a threshold is a necessary condition for minimizing
inequalities, I will bracket the concern with inequalities.
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“lottery, rotation, and representative sampling” ensured
this diversity (Ober 2012, 122).
Is the Pursuit of Truth Appropriate in Politics?
So far I have bracketed the question of what constitutes a
right or correct decision. Epistemic democrats differ on
whether they conceptualize correctness in veritistic or
non-veritistic terms. Original formulations of Condorcet
Jury Theorem understood correctness as objectively verifi-
able truth. On the basis of this procedure-independent
standard of correctness, an outcome can be assessed as
right or wrong without reference to the process by which
it was decided. For many epistemic theorists, this veritistic
conception of correctness is a defining feature of episte-
mic democracy (Landemore 2013, 208–30).
Whether claims of truth have any place in democracy is
highly contested. Hannah Arendt forcefully argued that
claims to truth preclude debate, which is “the very essence
of political life” (quoted in Villa [2000], 255). Indeed, the
nature of “truth” remains a contentious point among
scholars who are sympathetic to the principles and aims of
epistemic democracy. Peter (2009, 113–14), for example,
is wary of “the potentially anti-democratic implications of
emphasizing correctness.” This potential is revealed in
Ober’s (2012, 123–24) suggestion that democracy requires
an “epistemic sorting device” for “distinguishing . . . truth
from falsity (and) . . . weeding out false or irrelevant infor-
mation.” For him, “social knowledge” and routinization
perform this sorting function by providing citizens and
decision-makers with a shared context for trusting certain
individuals and knowledge claims over others.
Critics argue that the veritistic account of correctness
leaves little room for diverse values and judgments, and as-
sumes that those who oppose a decision have simply made
an error (Schwartzberg 2015, 199–200; Peter 2009, 113–
14). Estlund (2008, 98–116) resolves this problem with a
defense of democracy that rests on “epistemic
proceduralism.” He argues that even if democratic deci-
sions are not always right, they are legitimate because de-
mocracy is a procedure that tends to get things right. This
argument doesn’t appease critics because it still maintains
a commitment to a veritistic conceptualization of correct-
ness. Scholars inspired by Dewey argue that the epistemic
value of democracy can be obtained without holding to a
veritistic understanding of correctness (Anderson 2006, 13–
17; Peter 2009, 121–36). Understanding “correctness” as an
attribute generated by democratic processes is expected to
dissolve any despotic and technocratic tensions in episte-
mic democracy. In Dewey’s experimentalist model of epi-
stemic democracy, decision-making takes the form of “co-
operative social experimentation” (Anderson 2006, 13).
This involves diverse citizens determining issues of public
concern and possible solutions through inclusive discussion
before testing out actual decisions. Anderson (2006, 13) ex-
plains that “failures to solve the problem . . . or solving the
problem but at the cost of generating worse problems—
should be treated in a scientific spirit as disconfirmation of
our policies.” This replaces a veritistic epistemology with a
pragmatist one whereby the “right” decisions are those that
experience shows to improve human well-being (Peter
2009, 117–19). Inclusive and diverse participation thereby
becomes essential for good decision-making.
Dewey’s experimentalist account of democracy is attrac-
tive. But, contrary to its aims, we cannot separate it from a
veritistic account of truth. We can only determine whether
an experiment succeeded if we have some independent
conception of correctness. While we need to recognize
the anti-political potential of veritistic accounts of correct-
ness, dismissing the possibility of independent truth is nei-
ther necessary nor desirable. In practice, policymakers,
political analysts, and ordinary people tend to judge deci-
sions in hindsight as right or wrong. They make these
judgments on the basis of (a) whether they resolved a situ-
ation, and/or (b) whether they created further problems.
This implies that some decisions are indeed wrong, and
that a right decision existed whether or not it was discov-
ered at the time.
Positioning myself within these debates, I argue that we
can assume the existence of a procedure-independent
standard of correctness. In any situation, there is a correct
decision. This is the one that most effectively resolves a
problem with the fewest unintended negative conse-
quences. While the rightfulness of any given decision is
not an attribute generated by any particular procedure,
the likelihood of reaching the correct decision is
procedure-dependent. The procedure most likely to reach
a correct decision is one that maximizes inclusivity, diver-
sity, and competence. The greater the numbers, diversity,
and competence of those included, the greater the likeli-
hood of discarding bad ideas and identifying good ones.
This position distances us from Ober’s epistemic
“sorting device,” which risks becoming a tool of domina-
tion and exclusion. Assuming that a procedure-
independent standard of correctness exists does not re-
quire treating all knowledge claims as either true or false.
In some circumstances, this would be appropriate (for ex-
ample, on matters where there is a high degree of scien-
tific consensus). But in many circumstances, it is inappro-
priate and exclusionary. Decision-making on most issues
of public concern will implicate elements of objective
truth and falsity, as well as elements of subjective judg-
ment. Rather than resort to epistemic sorting devices, we
can trust humans’ capacity for reflecting on a diverse
range of subjective positions.
Returning to Aristotle’s words above (3), we can appre-
ciate his expectation that people would bring more than
simply verifiable information to the decision-making table;
they would bring practical wisdom. Waldron (1995, 569–70)
interprets this as knowledge, experience, judgment, and
insight. Pooling practical wisdom would likely produce
the best decisions concerning both factual and ethical
matters of policy and strategy. He cautioned against un-
derstanding this as simply a matter of aggregating individ-
ual knowledge; instead, the process is more “synthetic or
even dialectical.” Waldron (1995, 569–70) explained:
“(Aristotle’s) view is that deliberation among the many is
a way of bringing each citizen’s ethical views and in-
sights . . . to bear on the views and insights of each of the
others, so that they cast light on each other, providing a
basis for reciprocal questioning and criticism, and en-
abling a position to emerge which is better than any of
the inputs and much more than an aggregation or func-
tion of those inputs.”
Epistemic Democracy and Global Governance
Epistemic democracy is applicable to different systems of
rule, from the Athenian city-state to the modern nation-
state. In this section, I argue that epistemic democracy
also applies to rule-making beyond the nation-state.
Scholars often characterize systems of rule at this level in
terms of “global governance,” which refers to the multiple
structures and processes that shape collective responses to
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collective problems and create a sense of order within an
anarchical international system. Global governance
encompasses the “formal and informal institutions, mech-
anisms, relationships, and processes between and among
states, markets, citizens, and organizations—both intergov-
ernmental and nongovernmental—through which collec-
tive interests are articulated, rights and obligations are es-
tablished, and differences are mediated” (Thakur and
Langenhove 2006, 233). Global governance includes for-
mal and familiar institutions like the United Nations and
World Bank, but also informal and less familiar institu-
tions like Avaaz and the Verified Carbon Standard.
Whereas traditional studies of international relations fo-
cus on the state as the central authority in the interna-
tional system, global governance scholars recognize that
centers of authority and power are diverse and diffuse.
Global governance has many global governors (Avant et al.
2010, 1–31). Studying global governance involves identify-
ing and analyzing the governors within and beyond inter-
governmental institutions. Within intergovernmental insti-
tutions, decision-making power can lie with member-states
themselves, but also with the executive leadership and in-
ternational bureaucracies delegated to carry out institu-
tional mandates. Beyond intergovernmental institutions,
decision-making power can lie with private actors who es-
tablish institutions in response to particular global issues.
Consider, for example, the considerable power that the
Gates Foundation exerts on global health governance.
The epistemic democratization of global governance
could not occur in a predefined and logical sequence of
steps. Efforts to infuse global governance with epistemic-
democratic qualities will only ever be piecemeal. Processes
of decision-making vary across international institutions
with some emphasizing negotiation and bargaining,
others deliberation and consensus, and others equal or
weighted voting. The quality of each of these processes
could be enhanced by maximizing inclusivity, diversity,
and competence.10
Before elaborating on principles for the epistemic de-
mocratization of global governance, it is worth addressing
two plausible counterarguments. The skeptical reader may
question whether my theoretical assumptions can be rec-
onciled with the realities of world politics. I see two major
concerns.
First, epistemic democracy is an exercise in depoliticiza-
tion or domination: aspiring to solve problems through
inclusion and diversity requires ignoring the pervasiveness
of real political conflict in the international system. In the
real world, actors disagree on the very nature of problems
as well as desired outcomes. Implying that there is a
“right” solution denies this difference and allows only one
version of the “truth.” I offer two responses. Political theo-
rists concerned about deep disagreement generally point
to its cultural provenance (MacIntyre 1988). Cultural vari-
ety may be an ontological fact in the international system,
but we should not exaggerate the extent of deep differ-
ences relative to shared presuppositions (Kukathas 1994,
11). Cosmopolitan scholars have assembled legal, philo-
sophical, and anthropological evidence to support claims
that political and cultural communities are already (and
increasingly) cosmopolitan to some degree (Brown 2009;
Glenn 2013).
We should therefore treat the potential for deep moral
disagreement to occasionally foreclose political debate as
very real, but not pervasive. People of different traditions
and moral systems have often found ways to coexist. It is
possible to make good decisions in the face of difference
and conflict.11 Moreover, disagreements tend not to be so
fundamental that they are insensitive to factual condi-
tions. This is as true at the international level as it is at the
national level. Here, we can usefully distinguish between
“basic” and “nonbasic” value judgments: “A value judg-
ment can be called ‘basic’ to a person if the judgment is
supposed to apply under all conceivable circumstances,
and it is ‘nonbasic’ otherwise” (Sen 1970, 60). Fred may
firmly believe that child labor should be prohibited but
may revise this judgment if, say, he was shown evidence of
a positive correlation between child labor and school en-
rollment. In this case, Fred’s value judgment is nonbasic; it
is sensitive to factual conditions. Conversely, Jane may
hold that armed warfare is wrong, and under no conceiv-
able circumstances would she revise this judgment: Jane’s
value judgment is basic. While there may be no neutral po-
sition from which to arbitrate between basic disagree-
ments, pooling knowledge from diverse sources would
help us reach the “right” decision when faced with nonba-
sic disagreements.
The precise balance between basic and nonbasic dis-
agreements in global governance remains an open ques-
tion. Contemporary theorists of epistemic democracy as-
sume that nonbasic disagreements are more common,
even in heterogeneous polities like the United States
(Landemore 2014b, 202–5). Similarly, we can proceed un-
der the assumption that most of the disagreements that
occupy the time and attention of global political institu-
tions are of a nonbasic kind. Such conflicts are not intrac-
table. Epistemic democracy would be valuable even if it
could only work in such circumstances. But it can also ac-
commodate basic disagreements, perhaps more so than
the nation-state—because global politics lacks a supreme
authority. For most global problems, no single political in-
stitution enjoys an exclusive governance mandate.
Multiple public and private institutions govern most
global problems (health, development, environment,
etc.). If actors deeply disagree with the way an issue is pro-
blematized in one institution, they are often free to create
parallel institutions. Such governance experiments are
compatible with the aims of epistemic democracy.
The skeptical reader might also question whether the
experience of multilateral negotiations negates any possi-
bility of international epistemic democracy. Many negotia-
tion analysts hold that the difficulty of reaching agree-
ment increases with the size and diversity of the group
(Hampson and Hart 1995, 28). Others berate IR scholars’
pessimism about decision-making among large numbers
(Young 1994, 120–27; Buzan 1981, 341), or question
10 Beyond the broad principles I enumerate below, it is beyond the scope of
this article to elaborate on options for institutional reform, not least because
the institutions that constitute global governance are so diverse in their exist-
ing structures and procedures. Many IOs use voting procedures, which theo-
retically could be reformed to meet the demands of epistemic democracy.
However, we should not reduce epistemic democracy to voting (see pp. 4–5).
Communicative mechanisms already exist for pooling knowledge on a large
scale without recourse to voting (for example World Bank consultation pro-
cesses), or through a combination of deliberation and voting (for example
the WWViews project). An emerging literature is considering the possibilities
of pooling knowledge to reach collective judgments via Web 2.0 technologies
(for example Breindl and Francq [2008]).
11 Some people may be dissatisfied with decisions reached under epistemic
democratic conditions, but the best decision will be reached under these con-
ditions. The question of how we should deal with any resulting dissatisfaction
takes us beyond the instrumental justification for democracy, and beyond the
scope of this article.
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whether small, exclusive, minilateral experiments outper-
form multilateral institutions (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and
McGee 2013). Young (1994, 117–21) and Hopmann
(1995, 24) suggest that scholars and practitioners have
been socialized into a realist paradigm of negotiation, in
which distributive bargaining over fixed payoffs is all that
occurs. A problem-solving mode of “integrative bargain-
ing” (Odell 2010, 620–21) instead entails identifying com-
mon or complementary interests and solutions. This
mode of negotiation is not just a theoretical possibility;
many regimes were formed in such a way (Young 1994,
117–39).
It is certainly plausible that numbers and diversity can
enrich integrative bargaining while posing challenges for
distributive bargaining, but this remains uncertain. The
available evidence on the impact of numbers and diversity
on multilateral negotiations remains inconclusive. In ex-
ploring the impact of diversity (and other variables) on
multilateral negotiations, Narlikar (2010, 264–66) and her
colleagues found its effects difficult to distinguish from
those of power. The precise impact of diversity remained
a question for further research. When diversity was clearly
isolated as a distinct cause of deadlock, it tended to affect
trust among parties rather than their zone of possible
agreement. Mistrust presents a significant challenge, but
we can partly mitigate this through informal processes
and institutional mechanisms (Narlikar 2010, 12–13, 263).
Studies of local-level common pool resource gover-
nance offer reason for greater optimism about the poten-
tial for large-group decision-making. Some IR scholars
find the local commons a comparable context to the inter-
national system because in many cases (poor, weakly gov-
erned countries), the local level is effectively anarchical
(Keohane and Ostrom 1995, 1).12 Studies carried out and
inspired by Elinor Ostrom point to successful decision-
making among hundreds and even thousands of actors. A
recurring finding is that the size of the group matters less
for reaching a decision than issue-specific factors (dis-
count rates), institutional factors (transaction costs), and
communicative factors (common understanding of inter-
ests) (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, 1; Ostrom 1990, 211–
12).
The impact of heterogeneity remains contested and in-
conclusive (Ruttan 2008, 969–70). But it is clear that het-
erogeneity does not consistently or inevitably impede
decision-making in large groups. Sometimes heterogene-
ity facilitates decision-making by presenting more positive-
sum options (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, 9–10).
Increasing the number and diversity of actors involved in
deliberation and decision-making increases the complex-
ity of the process, and the time it takes to reach agree-
ment. But slow and complex processes are often the only
way to effectively respond to problems (Buzan 1981, 341).
Admittedly, I present epistemic democracy as an approach
for better decisions in global governance, not faster ones.
Having established that global governance is not be-
yond the scope of epistemic democracy, below I construct
an epistemic-democratic framework for evaluating global
governance. Epistemic democracy is a broad church with
diverse understandings about popular competence, cogni-
tive independence, and the nature of truth. I identified
the most robust and convincing positions on each of these
questions above. On that basis, I construct a framework
comprising three principles. The likelihood of making
correct decisions is increased if arrangements for global
governance:
A) Maximize human development and capacity for
participation
B) Maximize internal cognitive diversity within global
institutions
C) Maximize public opportunities for sharing objective and
subjective knowledge
I apply this framework below with the aim of showing
what epistemic democratization might look like at the
global level. My aim is not to present a comprehensive
evaluation of global governance. That would require se-
lecting a specific domain of global governance (for exam-
ple migration or finance); identifying the relevant public
and private institutions; and measuring their performance
on each principle. My aims are more modest. This explor-
atory evaluation reveals where epistemic-democratic defi-
cits might lie, and what processes might mitigate such
deficits.
A) Maximizing Human Development and Capacity
for Participation
Epistemic democratic theory holds that the more compe-
tent, diverse, and numerous the decision-makers, the
greater the likelihood of reaching the right decision. It is
thus imperative to reduce levels of ignorance and depriva-
tion that weaken capacity to contribute to debate and
decision-making. This is a problem for the global North
and South alike. Most public opinion research is limited
to the North, where studies reveal widespread ignorance
of social issues. For instance, citizens in the North overes-
timate levels of immigration and unemployment, and un-
derestimate democratic participation (Ipsos MORI 2015).
While support for international development assistance is
high among OECD countries, awareness of issues and gov-
ernmental support is very shallow. Americans mistakenly
assume that aid accounts for 27% of the national budget,
but it is less than 1% (Romano 2011). Awareness of inter-
national affairs is higher in Europe than in the United
States. This is attributed to the fact that public broad-
casters provide more international news coverage than
commercial broadcasters, and these are much more prom-
inent in Europe than in the United States (Iyengar et al.
2009, 342–43).
Access to good-quality education and exposure to accu-
rate and diverse sources of information is needed to miti-
gate ignorance. But more fundamental deprivations often
undermine capacity for participation. The capacity to
form reflected subjective judgments is constrained by
unmet basic needs that inhibit opportunities for reflection
and deliberation. The record of global institutions in ad-
dressing such deprivations remains inadequate. Since the
early 1990s, a human development paradigm has gov-
erned global efforts to address basic needs. This reflects a
shift away from a growth-centric economic development
paradigm in which GDP growth is sufficient for reducing
poverty. Inspired by Sen’s early work on capabilities,
Mahbub ul Haq launched the UNDP Human
Development Reports in 1990 (Fakuda-Parr 2011, 123).
National reports soon followed and have now been pro-
duced in about 135 countries (UNDP n.d.). Reporting on
such indicators as illiteracy, level of education, life
12 Keohane and Ostrom (1995, 1) explain: “Neither modern states nor small
farmers in remote areas of poor countries can appeal to authoritative hierar-
chies to enforce rules . . . . For small farmers in Asia (for example). . . national
governments are too remote or uncomprehending to be helpful in encourag-
ing productive cooperation.”
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expectancy, and gender inequality allows comparison of
human development trends over time. Quantitative indi-
cators have limitations, but they are a significant improve-
ment on earlier practices of reporting exclusively on GDP.
Successive reports over the past 25 years reveal that “most
people in most countries have been doing steadily better
in human development” (UNDP 2014, 1). But more than
2.2 billion continue to experience acute deprivation in
health, education, and standard of living (UNDP 2014, 2).
The Millennium Development Goals further institution-
alized a multidimensional needs and capability-based un-
derstanding of poverty (UNGA 2000). While some goals
were reached, the living conditions of millions of people
remain grim. The goal of halving the proportion of peo-
ple living in extreme poverty was achieved, thereby im-
proving the plight of some 700 million people globally. By
2010, 200 million people had moved from urban slums
into sanitary and durable housing. Most countries met the
goal of halving the percentage of chronically undernour-
ished people, yet this still leaves some 870 million people
living in hunger (UN 2013, 4). Enrollment in primary ed-
ucation increased by 83% during the goal period. But the
quality of education is parlous in many places and, as a re-
sult, many children remain illiterate (UN 2015). Perhaps
the clearest indication of deficit on this principle of epi-
stemic democracy is the fact that net aid disbursements
from the North to South have dropped in recent and con-
secutive years. Aid dropped by 2% from 2010 to 2011, and
by a further 4% from 2011 to 2012 (UN 2013, 5).
Deprivation and poverty marginalize many people from
debates about international affairs. Global institutions are
increasingly opening up to civil society, but as I show be-
low (pp. 23–24), it is mainly well-resourced and profes-
sionalized NGOs from the North who are able to gain ac-
cess. Ultimately, redoubling efforts to enhance human
development, as well as exposure to accurate and diverse
information on social issues and international affairs, is
necessary to enhance capacity for participation, and
thereby enhance the epistemic-democratic quality of
global governance. The new Sustainable Development
Goals offer reasons for optimism. Focusing on both the
North and the South, the goals include targets for reduc-
ing poverty, improving education, and ensuring that “all
learners acquire knowledge and skills needed to promote
sustainable development, including among others
through education for sustainable development and
sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, pro-
motion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citi-
zenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity” (UN
2015).
B) Maximizing Internal Cognitive Diversity Within Global
Institutions
At first glance, the international system is remarkably di-
verse: the United Nations General Assembly has 193 mem-
ber-states reflecting many different languages, cultures,
histories, and stages and styles of development. These
states have established numerous specialized agencies and
institutions to address common problems ranging from
trade and terrorism to food security and financial stability.
Alongside this multilateral system is a patchwork of com-
plementary and competitive minilateral clubs, and private
institutions that shape international responses to particu-
lar issues. If epistemic democracy thrives on diversity and
large numbers, global governance seemingly provides
ideal conditions. But this picture of diversity is unsettled
by considering two cases that expose hidden homogeneity
within ostensibly diverse institutions. The epistemic de-
mocratization of global governance requires identifying
factors that limit diversity and obscure homogeneity.
Multilateral negotiations involve a greater number of
participants than perhaps any other decision-making pro-
cess at the international level. But even when many states
are involved in deliberations and decision-making, cogni-
tive diversity can be diminished by hegemonic discourses.
Dryzek (2009, 9) argues that a discourse of market liberal-
ism “is accepted by most key actors in the world economic
system,” and has shaped multilateral debates and deci-
sions about development, trade, and financial stability.
The only source of contestation comes from outside multi-
lateral institutions.
Empirical analysis of negotiations under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change re-
veals a similar picture. Stevenson and Dryzek (2014) as-
sessed the legitimacy of climate negotiations by gauging
the extent to which deliberations reflected broader public
debate. These findings on discursive representation also
yield valuable insights for epistemic concerns about diver-
sity. While there is no hegemonic discourse on climate
change, limited discursive diversity is reflected in negotia-
tions (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 77–82). Annual climate
negotiations attract the participation of nearly 200 coun-
tries and up to 15,000 government delegates. These actors
frequently disagree about precise targets, mechanisms,
and institutions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and adapting to climate change. But their points of dis-
agreement obscure a high degree of homogeneity in the
way in which they perceive and problematize climate
change. Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, 37–60) identified
eight distinct climate change discourses in the “global
public sphere”: climate marketization; ecological moderni-
zation; equitable modernization; natural integrity; limits;
ecofeminism; radical decentralization; and new globalism
(see also Nasiritousi et al. [2014]). Only the first two are
well reflected in climate negotiations. Most parties assume
that climate change action can be defined within the pa-
rameters of the existing liberal capitalist system; that the
drive to compete and accumulate material goods and
wealth is an inherent aspect of human nature and rela-
tions; that low-carbon capitalism is a viable option by
decoupling pollution and profit; and that goals of eco-
nomic growth and ecological sustainability are compatible
given appropriate markets or regulation (Stevenson and
Dryzek 2014, 61–85). Some parties pair these economic-
reformist ideas with politically progressive ideals about
North–South equality and equitable burden sharing, but
they couch these concerns in narrow state-centric terms
that erase many judgments found in public debates about
climate change. Questions frequently raised in public de-
bates about the viability of industrial-scale development,
exponential economic growth and unconstrained popula-
tion growth, and the efficacy of market-based governance
mechanisms are absent in UN climate negotiations
(Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 79–90).
If increasing the number of parties involved in multilat-
eral negotiations is insufficient for maximizing diversity,
how can we improve diversity? The positions advanced in
negotiations develop on two fronts: at home (involving
the foreign policymaking community) and at the table
(involving negotiators, chairpersons, and sometimes secre-
tariats). For example, policy elites in governmental depart-
ments for the environment, economy, and foreign policy
are all involved in shaping a party’s position in climate
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negotiations (see Stevenson [2013]). This is one site to
target diversification by seeking to maximize the life expe-
riences and social positions that are represented. The
party delegates and negotiators then tasked with crafting
an international agreement present another diversifica-
tion target. Governments typically grant delegates some
flexibility in their mandates to account for uncertainty.
This provides some scope for creativity in the negotiation
process. Chairpersons in turn play a role in ensuring that
no single bloc or perspective dominates the deliberations
(Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 71–72). Finally, the bureau-
cratic staff attached to convention secretariats or interna-
tional organizations like the WTO play a part in shaping
how party positions and overall agreements develop
(Jinnah 2010).
We have limited knowledge of cognitive diversity at
these other levels of global institutions. However, in the
context of international bureaucracies, studies of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) offer insights into the
nature, causes, and consequences of epistemic homogene-
ity. While sometimes dismissed by IR scholars as epiphe-
nomenal, international bureaucracies are one necessary
site for internal cognitive diversification. They affect
decision-making through organizing information, ratio-
nalizing complex issues, applying specialized knowledge,
facilitating negotiation, and building capacity (Barnett
and Finnemore 2004, 1–10).
Epistemic homogeneity compromises the performance
of each of these functions, but in the IMF a narrow merit-
based recruitment strategy produces such homogeneity.
Evans and Finnemore’s (2001, 9–12) analysis of recruit-
ment strategies in the IMF found a strong emphasis on
elite institutional education and competence in a dominant
macroeconomic paradigm. The result was an overwhelm-
ingly high proportion of male staff with doctoral degrees
from North American universities. No staff members were
trained outside an industrialized country. Internal and ex-
ternal critics refer to the hiring strategy as “intellectual
monocropping” (Evans and Finnemore 2001, 9–12) and a
“cloning syndrome” (Michael Camdessus, quoted in
Momani [2007], 51). IMF staff themselves recognize the ex-
tent and consequences of homogeneity. Some complain
that innovation, flexibility, and risk-taking are discouraged;
others describe the culture as technical, economistic,
homogeneous, and conforming (IMF 1999, 32; IEO 2006,
49; Momani 2007, 46–51). This manifests in a “textbook”
(Momani 2007, 46) approach to policymaking that does
not sufficiently take into consideration the political context
in which they will implement these policies. Cognitive
biases also played a part in the IMF’s failure to anticipate
the 2008 global financial crisis. A study by the IMF’s
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO 2011, 1) pointed to
“groupthink” and a “lack of incentives to . . . raise contrar-
ian views.” They observed a prevailing view among staff that
“market discipline and self-regulation would be sufficient
to stave off serious problems” (IEO 2011, 7). Injecting di-
verse wisdom into international bureaucracies requires
modifying the incentive structures that promote candor or
silence (IEO 2011, 1), as well as deliberate recruitment
strategies. In the IMF, Momani (2007) recommends re-
cruiting more staff from the South; mid-career officials
with policy experience and alternative organizational cul-
tures; and social science graduates (52–53).
There are multiple avenues for enhancing cognitive di-
versity in global institutions. Epistemic democratization is
a slow and piecemeal process that we can advance by di-
versifying global governors in multiple settings. This
section focused on state-based processes and institutions,
but private governance networks and exclusive minilateral
clubs are also susceptible to intellectual capture and insu-
larity (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 82–119). Internal di-
versification strategies may improve the cognitive diversity
of global institutions, but epistemic democratization of
global governance also requires attention to the external
environment of global institutions. Truly diversifying the
pool of ideas and knowledge to which “global governors”
are exposed is most likely to require better engagement
with heterogeneous civil society. I examine the quality of
existing engagement in the following section.
C) Maximizing Public Opportunities for Sharing Objective and
Subjective Knowledge
The right decisions would likely emerge when inclusivity,
diversity, and competence are maximized in global
decision-making. Right decisions are those that most ef-
fectively resolve problems with the fewest unintended neg-
ative consequences. Anticipating potential problems and
crafting alternative responses requires pooling experi-
ences, insights, and objective and subjective knowledge.
Civil society organizations can help tap into such diverse
wisdom. Civil society is defined as the voluntary associa-
tions that form a part of society distinct from states and
markets: NGOs, trade unions, religious groups, profes-
sional and business associations, media, and social move-
ments (Edwards 2009, 20). In practice, the spheres of
state, market, and civil society are often blurred, but civil
society should be concerned with shaping rules for social
life without aspiring to “public office or pecuniary gain”
(Scholte 2004, 214).13 In the case of business, we must
“distinguish between profit-seeking activities by individual
enterprises and the civic or political role of business asso-
ciations” (Edwards 2009, 29). The former is excluded
from civil society, but the latter is included.
The 1990s and early 2000s saw international organiza-
tions open up to CSOs (Tallberg and Uhlin 2012).
Analysis of civil society participation in thirty-two
European and global institutions shows that almost all in-
stitutions involve consultation; half operate a scheme for
selecting and accrediting civil society organizations to al-
low them access to certain meetings (usually with the right
to speak and distribute materials), and over half have ar-
rangements for outreach and liaison meetings (Steffek
and Nanz 2008, 19–21). Recent analysis confirmed a gen-
eral trend toward more openness over the past sixty years,
and particularly after 1990 (Tallberg et al. 2013, 67). To
some degree, this opening is in response to legitimacy de-
mands of civil society and stronger democratic norms
within states. But it probably owes more to the perceived
functional benefits of involving transnational non-state ac-
tors, such as tapping into expertise and services (Tallberg
et al. 2013, 67).
Although international organizations are opening up,
concerns remain about the quality and impact of civil soci-
ety inclusion. Generally, civil society is consulted at the
policy formation stage, excluded from decision-making,
and included again in policy implementation (Tallberg
et al. 2013, 67, 217). From an epistemic-democratic per-
spective, this staggered participation is not necessarily
13 Scholars observe that proximity to the state or market can moderate the cri-
tique of CSOs. The uniquely critical and independent perspective that CSOs
can provide is thus endangered if too many CSOs collaborate with state or
market actors (Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014).
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problematic—provided that the shared perspectives are
reflected upon and taken into account during decision-
making. Problems arise when only certain voices are
heard, and when consultation is not meaningfully con-
nected to decision-making.
An effect of massive global inequalities is that many voi-
ces are not heard inside political institutions. Studies on en-
vironmental and trade negotiations confirm that access to
international organizations is largely reserved for well-
resourced civil society organizations from the North
(Piewitt 2010, 480; Urhe 2013, 9; Hanegraaff et al. 2015).
But this does not reveal the full extent of dominance and
exclusion. Inequalities also have societal and sectoral di-
mensions, affecting which voices are heard. Highton (2009,
1564) argues that knowledge is a resource whose distribu-
tion is skewed toward white, well-educated, and financially
secure men. Wealthy and highly educated citizens in the
North and South are more aware of the profiles and activi-
ties of international bodies like the UN Security Council
(Dellmuth Forthcoming). This knowledge advantage is of-
ten coupled with a resource advantage that allows these
groups to seize opportunities for participation.
Unsurprisingly, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups (for
example women, poor, and non-white people) are less
likely to engage with international political processes (Uhre
2013, 128, 148). The epistemic quality of decision-making
is undermined to the extent that their perspectives are
unexpressed in deliberations leading to decisions.
It is also widely observed that among non-state actors,
business interests enjoy relatively privileged access to global
institutions. But the pattern of dominance is nuanced.
Business dominance is more pronounced in trade negotia-
tions than environmental ones. In climate change and bio-
diversity institutions, environmental civil society organiza-
tions have secured stronger or more balanced
representation (Uhre 2013, 155). The strength of business
interests in civil society masks its own inequalities: business
associations in the South are limited or weak, and are far
less likely to participate in global institutions than other ad-
vocacy groups (Piewitt 2010); while in the North, small busi-
nesses, cooperatives, and social enterprises are far weaker in
their political representation than large corporations.
Even if we could eliminate inequalities, we would still
face logistical challenges of tapping into the knowledge of
large numbers of widely dispersed people. Universal direct
participation is impossible. Opportunities for sharing
knowledge need to be structured in ways that better con-
nect broader publics with a more limited number of ac-
tors who have direct institutional access. Decisions taken
in international institutions can have impacts at local and
national levels that neither decision-makers nor affected
people anticipate. Engaged civil society organizations have
a role to play in bridging this epistemic and spatial divide
by promoting and informing public debate at local and
national levels and transmitting knowledge and experi-
ence from these levels to global institutions. More heads
are better than one, but we can only apply this edict in
the global context if we think creatively about how to ap-
ply the minds of the many to distant decisions.
International efforts to control disease epidemics illus-
trate the importance of connective broader publics to
decision-making institutions. Dominant modes of epi-
demic governance emphasize certain framings of the
problem and privilege certain forms of knowledge. This
has the effect of excluding a variety of other epidemic
“narratives,” which in turn can undermine efforts to con-
trol disease outbreaks (Leach et al. 2010; Dry and Leach
2010). Leach et al. (2010, 372) show that the dominant
narrative within international agencies interprets disease
dynamics in terms of “sudden emergence, speedy, far-
reaching, often global spread,” and favors a response of
“universalised, generic emergency oriented control, at
source, aimed at eradication.” This framing privileges for-
mal science and epidemiology to define and solve the
problem. Outbreaks of Ebola in Africa are interpreted
through this narrative, which focuses international coop-
eration on urgent responses at the point of outbreak (for
example the World Health Organization’s International
Health Regulations, and Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network). Outbreaks in Congo have been secu-
ritized, with neighboring countries closing borders and
placing police and military on high alert. Alternative nar-
ratives on Ebola exist among NGOs and local communi-
ties and may lead to alternative—and potentially more ef-
fective—responses. These include a development-oriented
narrative stressing “the structural causes of inequity and
disease vulnerability amongst particular populations. . .and
address[ing] the long-term implications” (Leach et al.
2010, 372). This draws attention, for example, to the rela-
tionship between deforestation and vulnerability to hem-
orrhagic fevers (through closer contact with forest animal
reservoirs). A local narrative interprets Ebola as endemic
and emphasizes the various control and response mecha-
nisms that have existed for years and can be integrated
into larger-scale international responses (Leach et al.
2010, 372). Civil society organizations with access to inter-
national institutions have a role to play in communicating
with national and local citizen groups to promote debate
or tap into existing debates and practices at national and
local levels. This is required to ensure that they are cogni-
zant of alternative narratives and knowledge claims. These
debates and practices may occur with some degree of ig-
norance of global processes and narratives. Hence, the
transmission of knowledge and ideas is a two-way process
between the local/national level and the global level.
A remaining challenge for epistemic democratization is
to make public access politically consequential. We should
not applaud expanded opportunities for sharing knowl-
edge if these have no impact on decisions. Cases of incon-
sequential or purely symbolic civil society engagement
could probably be documented across all global issues.
The World Trade Organization’s engagement structures
are illustrative. In response to civil society protests, the
WTO has sought to make its processes more transparent
and facilitate more public access. Civil society is still
banned from negotiating sessions, and while they can ob-
serve plenary sessions, they cannot make oral or written
submissions. Opportunities for sharing knowledge are
largely limited to pre-conference dialogues between WTO
committee staff and civil society. These serve to “elicit
views from NGOs” (Williams 2011, 116–17) but are largely
divorced from decision processes. At best they are ineffec-
tive, at worst merely tokenistic. Inconsequential public en-
gagement is yet one more sign of the epistemic-
democratic deficit of global governance.
Conclusion
A growing body of literature at the intersection of
International Relations and democratic theory sensitizes
us to moral reasons for taking global democracy seriously.
It argues that, if people are affected by supranational deci-
sions, then they deserve the opportunity to interact with
or influence those decision-making processes. This
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provides a persuasive, but incomplete, justification for en-
hancing participation in global governance. In this article,
I sought to bolster the case for global democracy by devel-
oping an instrumentalist justification for maximizing inclu-
sivity and diversity in global governance. The complexity
and scale of problems facing the international community
strain the capacity of states and global institutions to effec-
tively respond. Of course, democracy should not be re-
served only for particularly challenging and complex
problems. It is in such contexts that the perils of group-
think and exclusion become particularly apparent.
It has become a cliche´ to say that global problems re-
quire global solutions. But for too long this statement has
simply underscored the importance of states cooperating
through multilateral institutions. Impatient with the pace
of multilateral negotiations, some call for a shift to small
minilateral institutions (Naım 2009). Others look to gov-
ernance networks of businesses, states, and occasionally
non-governmental organizations (Hoffman 2011). But ef-
fective global governance is unlikely to emerge from these
institutions unless they are able to better harness diverse
knowledge and judgments that lie beyond them. Global
democracy scholars and activists must devise and demand
processes and mechanisms that better connect global gov-
ernors with the wisdom of the many. This article provided
a justification for taking this agenda forward, and a frame-
work for identifying epistemic deficits in existing global
governance. Drawing on historical and contemporary de-
bates about epistemic democracy, I distilled three princi-
ples that constitute an epistemic-democratic framework
for evaluating global governance. These principles are not
inextricable parts of a single democratizing process. They
may prove mutually reinforcing, but progress on any one
principle is not a precondition for progress on any
other.14 The epistemic quality of global governance may
gradually improve by enhancing performance on any of
these principles. Democratization is always a slow process,
and we should expect piecemeal progress.
In advancing this research agenda, scholars should aim
to pool wisdom from diverse subdisciplines in political sci-
ence and law. Moral concerns about the democratic defi-
cit of global governance already capture the attention of
scholars of international relations and international law.
Taking seriously debates in political theory about the epi-
stemic qualities of democracy could deepen and
strengthen existing arguments for inclusion, participation,
transparency, and accountability at the global level. By en-
gaging with analysts of global decision-making, political
theorists in turn can advance and extend their arguments
about core aspects of epistemic democracy, including the
nature and significance of competence, diversity, and
truth, and the scope conditions of epistemic democracy.
I propose three directions for future research on global
epistemic democracy. First, to apply the epistemic demo-
cratic framework outlined above to comprehensively eval-
uate different domains of global governance, such as
health, migration, security, and others. This will build on
the exploratory evaluation presented here, and confirm
the nature and extent of the epistemic-democratic deficit
in global governance. Such research should also broaden
our understanding of theoretically ideal and politically
possible institutional reforms.15
Second, understanding the options for global epistemic
democratization requires assessment of the mechanisms
for pooling knowledge and aggregating judgments at the
global level. Different global political institutions use dif-
ferent forms of voting and deliberation to promote debate
and make decisions. Knowledge of the epistemic merits of
such procedures at the global level remains limited.
Various procedures are also currently used to tap into
knowledge outside decision-making settings (such as
stakeholder consultations, global citizen forums, and
Track 2 diplomacy). Assessing how well these perform—in
terms of inclusiveness and promoting two-way knowledge
transmission—will help identify promising options for
global epistemic democratization.
Third, we need to recognize the factors that undermine
epistemic-democratic principles. Deeper analysis of exist-
ing democratic deficits could yield insight into the power
relations and incentive structures that promote confor-
mity with dominant discourses. It will also point to other
factors that limit diversity and promote homogeneity in
global institutions. Documenting cases of inconsequential
inclusion of non-state actors would allow for carefully tar-
geted and specified critiques of the democratic deficits in
global governance. Drawing lessons from cases of mean-
ingful inclusion would also help identify the most effective
institutional mechanisms (and conducive political condi-
tions) for transmitting dispersed and diverse knowledge
to decision-making settings.
As political authority diffuses beyond the nation-state, it
is appropriate that democratic aspirations are also
stretched to the global level. This matters for ensuring le-
gitimate and effective rule. By maximizing inclusion and
diversity, global democracy can produce better outcomes
than other systems of rule. The rule of the many is ulti-
mately superior to the rule of one or rule of the few. This
is just as true for global governance as it is for the nation-
state.
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